The Yale Undergraduate Research Journal
Volume 2
Issue 1 Spring 2021

Article 31

2021

Incomplete? Or Indefinite? Intuitionism on Gödel’s First
Incompleteness Theorem
Quinn Crawford
Yale University

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj
Part of the Mathematics Commons, and the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Crawford, Quinn (2021) "Incomplete? Or Indefinite? Intuitionism on Gödel’s First Incompleteness
Theorem," The Yale Undergraduate Research Journal: Vol. 2 : Iss. 1 , Article 31.
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol2/iss1/31

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at
Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Yale Undergraduate Research Journal by an authorized editor of
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact
elischolar@yale.edu.

Incomplete? Or Indefinite? Intuitionism on Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem
Cover Page Footnote
Written for Professor Sun-Joo Shin’s course PHIL 437: Philosophy of Mathematics.

This article is available in The Yale Undergraduate Research Journal: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol2/iss1/
31

Crawford: Intuitionism on Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem

Crawford | Philosophy

Incomplete? Or Indefinite? Intuitionism
on Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem
By Quinn Crawford1
1
Department of Philosophy, Yale University

ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes two natural-looking arguments that seek to leverage Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem for and against intuitionism, concluding in both cases that the argument is unsound because it equivocates on the meaning of “proof,” which differs between formalism and intuitionism. I argue that this difference explains why “proof” has definite extension for the formalist but not for the intuitionist. Sections 1-3
summarize various philosophies of mathematics and Gödel’s result. Section 4 argues that, because the Gödel
sentence of a formal system is provable to the intuitionist, they are neither aided nor attacked by Gödel’s first
incompleteness theorem. Section 5 concludes that the intuitionist’s notion of proof is indefinitely extensible.

INTRODUCTION
“Naïve set theory” was not always called that — it took Bertrand
Russell’s observation that the axiom of unrestricted comprehension, with which one can construct a set from any predicate, gives
rise to one antinomy after another. The predicate “x is an ordinal”?
Burali-Forti paradox. “x is a cardinal”? Cantor’s paradox. “x∉x”?
This is the most famous, named after Russell himself: if there were
a set R containing all sets which are not elements of themselves,
we find that R is an element of R if and only if it is not (Hrbáček
& Jech, 1999, p. 2). Gottlob Frege’s logicist project, which sought
to reduce mathematical truth to logical truth, relied crucially on
the axiom of unrestricted comprehension, so the revelation of these
paradoxes came as a devastating blow. With mathematical foundations crumbling, how do we proceed?
Two bold, competing stances on the nature of mathematics arose.
German mathematician David Hilbert sought to avoid paradox by
abandoning semantics, and his formalist project attempted to reduce mathematics to a fixed collection of syntactic rules. He strongly believed that every true mathematical proposition, and in particular every true proposition about arithmetic, could be proven using
only these rules. Dutch mathematician L. E. J. Brouwer sought to
avoid paradox by abandoning syntax, insisting that mathematics
is about ideas in one’s mind. He only allowed constructive proofs,
which led his intuitionist project to forgo classical logic and reject
the law of excluded middle. Formalism seemed like a safer bet, until Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem showed that no sufficiently
powerful formal system can prove every arithmetical truth — another devastating blow.

site directions: on the one hand, Gödel’s result seems to vindicate
the intuitionist’s rejection of the law of excluded middle, but on the
other hand, it seems to repudiate their connection of mathematical
truth with provability. I conclude that these arguments neither support nor threaten Brouwer’s program, since the meaning of “proof”
is different for intuitionists and formalists. In particular, I argue (in
Section 5) that while the formalist’s notion of proof has definite
extension, the intuitionist’s notion of proof does not — rather, it is
what Michael Dummett calls an “indefinitely extensible” concept
(1978, p. 195). Given any sufficiently powerful formal system of
arithmetic, there is a true proposition that cannot be proven except
by methods outside of that system, and it is because intuitionists
employ these methods that they are left both unsupported and unscathed by Gödel’s result.

1. FORMALISM

The formalist maintains that mathematics can be understood
through a lens that is purely syntactic, divorced from the semantic
meanings we usually attach to mathematical statements. Sentences
in the language of arithmetic can be viewed, not as propositions,
but as strings of letters on the page, and what mathematics is, at
bottom, is the process of turning one string of letters into another. Deduction rules are the acceptable ways of manipulating the
symbols in a string, e.g., pointing out when one can add a dash to
the end of a sentence or write a new sentence given two preceding
ones. To begin with, we have a recursive set of axioms, which are
simply the statements we start off with.1 Together, axioms and deduction rules comprise a formal system, and the theorems of any
particular system are just the sentences that one can produce by
Does Gödel’s result only affect Hilbert’s program, or does it bear applying a finite sequence of deduction rules to its axioms. Once a
on Brouwer’s as well? In this paper, I will analyze its effect on in- theorem is proven, it can, in turn, be used as part of the deductions
tuitionism. To do this, I will first summarize some of the main ideas for other theorems, having itself already been established.
behind formalism (Section 1), Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem (Section 2), and intuitionism (Section 3). In Section 4, I ana- 1 We insist that the set of axioms is recursive, meaning there is a way to compute
lyze two arguments which, at first glance, tug intuitionism in oppo- whether a sentence S is an axiom or not.
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Formalists insist that there is no need to view mathematics as anything above and beyond swapping symbols around, erasing them,
writing new ones, and so on. This is because these systems work
just as well under the assumption that the letters on the page are
complete gibberish and do not refer to anything at all. In making
this move, formalists avoid hefty questions that arise about the ontological status of mathematical objects. To ask whether a mathematical proposition is true is not to ask about what type of existence, if any, that mathematical objects enjoy, but rather to ask
whether, from a particular set of axioms and deduction rules, we are
able to derive a sentence which expresses that proposition. For this
reason, Hilbert writes, formal systems are valuable for their ability
to “determine a position of a given theorem within the system of
known truths and their logical connections in such a way that one
can clearly see which assumptions are necessary and sufficient to
justify the considered truth” (Hilbert, 1902, p. 50. Translation in
Murawski, 2002, p. 96).

2. GÖDEL’S FIRST INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM

sive enough to represent certain predicates about its own sentences,
and indeed the most enlightening component of Gödel’s proof is
his demonstration that “all meta-mathematical statements about the
structural properties of expressions in the formal calculus can be
accurately mirrored within the calculus itself” (Nagel, Newman, &
Hofstadter, 2001, p. 80).
Most crucially, if a formal system F is consistent and powerful
enough to be of real interest to mathematicians, Gödel proved that
the property of “being provable within the formal system F” is representable in F itself. This means that the system is able to talk about
its own theorems, even though, when viewed through a different
lens, it is just talking about the properties of natural numbers. This
collapse of meta-mathematics to mathematics, the ability to reason
about sentences in the language of arithmetic in the language of
arithmetic, is at the heart of Gödel’s proof.3 He used this ability to
construct a sentence G, written in the language of arithmetic, such
that neither G nor ¬G is provable in F (the sentence G is known as
the Gödel sentence). This alone directly proves the result: F is incomplete in light of its inability to prove G and its inability to prove
¬G. This, syntactically, is what it means for a system to be incomplete. However, the importance of Gödel’s
result is magnified in light of the fact that
G is true upon being interpreted meta-mathematically. This has to do with how Gödel
constructed G, “a sentence purely in the
arithmetical vocabulary of number theory
that inherits that crucial property of being
true if and only if not a theorem of number
theory” (Quine, 1976, p. 17). So, because G
is not a theorem (which is part of how we
just showed F to be incomplete), it follows
immediately that G is true. This means there
is no consistent formal system with a recursive set of axioms that can prove all the true
propositions about arithmetic.

The two most pressing questions one can
ask about a formal system are whether it is
consistent and whether it is complete. If a
system is inconsistent, meaning it contains
a contradiction, then it is possible to prove
any sentence whatsoever, which is disastrous.2 And an incomplete system is too
weak to be welcome, since it leaves out certain statements — there is a sentence S such
that neither S nor ¬S is provable. Hilbert’s
formalist project had as its goal to demonstrate a formal system of arithmetic that was
axiomatizable, consistent, and complete.
That is, he wanted a recursive set of axioms
and deduction rules which could be used
to prove, for any statement in the language
of arithmetic, either that statement or its negation (but not both).
When given the standard interpretation, this system would contain 3. INTUITIONISM
all the true arithmetical propositions and only the true arithmetical
propositions.
We have a clear case for the formalist’s dismay about Gödel’s first
incompleteness theorem. How the intuitionist fares in this regard is
We now have the conceptual framework in which to appreciate the also of great importance, and the verdict depends crucially on what
significance of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. This result it means to them for a mathematical proposition to be true. Intulaid bare the hubris of Hilbert’s expectation that there would be an itionists do not believe that mathematical objects enjoy any kind of
axiomatizable, complete, and consistent formal system of arithme- existence outside the mind, but rather that they “exist only in virtue
tic by showing that none could be all three: if a sufficiently pow- of our mathematical activity, which consists in mental operations,
erful system is axiomatizable and consistent, then it is incomplete. and have only those properties which they can be recognized by
The theorem holds for any consistent formal system that is expres- us as having” (Dummett, 2000, p. 5). Thus, a mathematical proposition’s truth depends upon our having some idea that proves it,
2
It is a quick exercise in classical logic to show that the theoremhood of both S and rather than there being a mathematical reality which confers it or a
¬S means that every single sentence in the formal language can be proven by the derivation of some string that expresses it within a formal system.
system, which renders the system completely useless.
Further, their requirement is that this idea be constructive in na3
The way he did this was through a method called Gödel numbering, which ture. Constructive proofs exhibit the truth of their result directly,
uniquely assigns a natural number to each sentence in the language of arithmetic. rather than by reductio-style reasoning.

“There is no consistent
formal system with a
recursive set of axioms
that can prove all the true
propositions about
arithmetic.”

A formal system must be sufficiently powerful to have the expressive ability to reference itself in this way, which is why there are weaker systems (like those which
only model addition) that are complete. But because they are so weak, these systems
also fail to prove all the arithmetical truths, hence the severity of Gödel’s result to
Hilbert’s program.
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are coextensive: a proposition P is true if and only if we have a
constructive proof which concludes that P, and a proposition P is
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false if and only if we have a constructive proof which concludes
that ¬P. What happens when we have neither? A famous example
is Goldbach’s conjecture, which asserts that every even number
greater than 2 can be written as the sum of two primes; at the time
of my writing this, there has been no constructive proof either of
Goldbach’s conjecture or its negation. In the event that someone
comes up with a constructive proof of Goldbach’s conjecture next
Thursday, intuitionists will believe that Goldbach’s conjecture is
true next Thursday even though it is not true today. More generally,
their notion of mathematical truth includes a parameter for tense,
and every mathematical proposition is neither true nor false until
the time at which it receives the proper kind of proof. That is, the
law of excluded middle does not hold.

Crawford | Philosophy

careful not to equivocate on the meaning of “provable.” Given their
extremely different notions of what constitutes a proof, there will
be disagreement about which mathematical propositions are provable, and thus about which mathematical propositions are true. In
particular, unlike the formalist, the intuitionist is not system-bound
in their methods of reasoning. The mental constructions that the
intuitionist finds acceptable as proofs are not restricted to whatever can be proven through syntactic manipulations within a formal
system. Rather, the intuitionist feels at liberty to engage in meta-mathematical reasoning about arithmetic that is not restricted to
the language of arithmetic itself. The formalist, because of their
boundedness to a system’s axioms and deduction rules, is not per-

This is a radical stance on the nature of mathematical truth, one
which follows directly from the intuitionist’s connection of truth
with proof, and its consequences are significant. Mathematicians
can no longer bifurcate the world into cases depending on whether
a proposition is true or false — a proposition may fail to be true
while at the same time failing to be false. Furthermore, “no a priori
ground exists for supposing we must be capable either of proving
the statement or of refuting it,” so it is not even inevitable that it mitted this leeway: every claim they make about arithmetic must
will become true or false at some point in the future (Dummett, be expressed at the level of arithmetic itself, through propositions
2000, p. 3).
involving natural numbers. Gödel showed that this is still a very
powerful language for one to be able to speak, that it is possible to
represent meta-mathematical predicates as propositions which have
natural numbers as their object. But because they are not bound
4. PROOF BEYOND PROOF
to any fixed axiomatization of arithmetic, the intuitionist regards
How should the intuitionist react to Gödel’s first incompleteness certain mathematical propositions as provable which the formalist
theorem? It is not obvious whether they ought to celebrate his result does not.
or start engaging in apologetics, so we will consider an argument to
each effect, beginning with a celebration. A proposition for which Here is the crucial point: while the formalist cannot assert the truth
no proof has been given, and no proof of its negation has been or falsity of the Gödel sentence G, because it is undecidable in their
given, bears a striking similarity to the sentence G at the center of formal system F, the intuitionist will insist that G is true. They
Gödel’s proof, which is constructed such that neither G nor ¬G is claim that they arrive at this conclusion by having the right kind
a theorem of the formal system F and thus shows that F is incom- of idea about it, and indeed from the construction of G it is clear
plete. It is this similarity which motivates an argument I describe to anyone who is reasoning about the formal system, but who is
not limited to the proof methods of the formal system, that what
below:
G says is true. That is, “although the sentence G consists only of
arithmetic terminology, to establish G we must invoke something
Formalists insist that mathematical statements in a formal
other
than the meanings of arithmetic terminology,” which is what
system can be understood merely as strings of symbols with
the
intuitionist,
but not the formalist, is able to invoke (Shapiro,
no semantic content, meaning they do not have to be treated
1998,
p.
615).
Recall
that in Gödel’s proof, G is constructed such
as propositions. But the formal systems of interest to maththat
it
is
true
if
and
only
if G is not a theorem of the formal system
ematicians, like the arithmetic one Hilbert had in mind, are
F.
Because
G
is
not
a
theorem
of F, it follows immediately that G is
such that, under a given interpretation, the theorems express
true.
This
type
of
meta-mathematical
reasoning, one which inspects
true mathematical propositions. Through this lens, the forwhat
G
is
“saying”
above
and
beyond
the arithmetical relationships
malist agrees with the intuitionist that truth is coextensive
between
natural
numbers
its
symbols
express,
would constitute the
with proof: a mathematical proposition is true if and only if it
intuitionist’s
proof
of
G,
the
one
which
grounds
their claim that G
is provable. The sentence G cannot be proven, so we cannot
say of G that it is true. Likewise, the sentence ¬G cannot be
expresses a true mathematical proposition.
proven, so we cannot say of G that it is false. So, in the forThus, the celebratory argument fails: Gödel’s first incompleteness
mal system F, we cannot assert of every mathematical proptheorem does not vindicate the intuitionist’s rejection of the law
osition that it is either true or false (which is what it means,
of excluded middle. The intuitionist would not say of G that it besemantically, for F to be incomplete). Does this not vindicate
longs in the same category as Goldbach’s conjecture, a proposition
the intuitionist’s rejection of the law of excluded middle?
we presently cannot prove or disprove (and may never be able to).
This celebratory argument relies on the claim that both formalists Rather, they would surely assert of G that it is true, employing reaand intuitionists view mathematical truth as coextensive with math- soning that is not system-bound. That is, although G fails to be
ematical proof. Strictly speaking, this is correct, but we must be provable in the formal system F, it does not fail to be a provable
Published by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2021
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mathematical proposition. There is a lingering question, though: sitions will be missing a provableI mathematical proposition, and
what falls under the intuitionist’s notion of proof, given that it is not the reason this is so depends crucially on the meta-mathematical
captured by a formal system?
meaning of the Gödel sentence.
For the moment, we will let this question linger so we can consider an argument seeking to leverage Gödel’s result against the
intuitionists. The dreary argument I present below maintains that
incompleteness is just as devastating to intuitionism as it is to formalism:
Intuitionists view truth as coextensive with proof: a mathematical proposition is true if and only if it is provable. But “as
a consequence of Gödel’s theorems, truth cannot be equated with provability in any effectively axiomatizable theory,”
which means it is wrong for the intuitionist to equate truth
with provability in this way (Raattkainen, 2005, p. 516). The
Gödel sentence G is an example of a true but unprovable
mathematical proposition, which means, contra the intuitionist, that the extension of truth does not coincide with the extension of proof.

It is by virtue of being system-bound that the extension of “proofF”
is definite. Given the axioms and deduction rules of F, the theorems
of F are the same in every possible world — the set of sentences a
formal system can prove is modally rigid. But because its methods
of proof are fixed in place, they refuse to budge when we might like
them to, as in the case of being able to reason meta-mathematically
about the Gödel sentence G. This is why the full weight of Gödel’s
first incompleteness theorem comes crashing down on formalists,
like a punch they cannot dodge on account of their shoes being
nailed to the floor. That their proof methods are fixed means there
is a true mathematical proposition the formalist cannot account for:
the Gödel sentence, which asserts of itself that it cannot be proven
using those methods.
No matter what lengths are taken to avoid it, this is a problem which
befalls any sufficiently powerful formal system of arithmetic. One
might think that adding the Gödel sentence G as an axiom to F
would make F complete, but Gödel showed that formal systems are
incomplete not because they lack axioms, but rather because they
are so expressive that they can represent the predicate “provableF”
about their own sentences. This means that “for any definite characterization of a class of grounds for making an assertion about all
natural numbers, there will be a natural extension of it,” one which
includes its Gödel sentence as a theorem (Dummett, 1978, p. 194).
But for each such augmentation, a new Gödel sentence strays from
the fold. In an extended formal system F’ which is able to prove
G, we can form a new Gödel sentence G’ which asserts its own
unprovability in F’, making F’ incomplete. And in an extended formal system F’’ which is able to prove G’, we can form a new Gödel
sentence G’’ which asserts its own unprovability in F’’, making F’’
incomplete. And in the extended formal system F’’’…

By what we said in response to the first argument, the equivocation
here on the meaning of “proof” should be obvious. Call a proposition provableF if it is provable to a formalist (meaning it is expressed by a string of symbols that can be derived within the formal
system F) and provableI if it is provable to an intuitionist (meaning
someone has constructed the result in their mind). This dreary argument asserts that because G is not provableF, it is therefore not
provableI. This leap is unfounded, since we have just shown how an
intuitionist would reason to proveI G, even though they agree that
G is not provableF. Gödel’s result shows that not all arithmetical
truths are provableF, but this does not imply that not all arithmetical
truths are provableI. The intuitionist’s methods of reasoning are not
system-bound, and for this reason they are able to avoid an attack
from someone seeking to leverage Gödel’s result against them. But,
by the same token, they do not get to claim any support from it for
their rejection of the law of excluded middle. Here again we can In each case, the intuitionist uses meta-mathematical reasoning
ask, albeit in slightly different language, the same lingering ques- that is outside the bounds of the formal system at hand in order
tion: what are the provableI propositions?
to prove that the respective Gödel sentence expresses a true proposition. Any formal system of arithmetic has a natural way to be
made more inclusive, namely by altering it so that the respective

5. INDEFINITE EXTENSIBILITY

The meaning of “proofF” clearly differs from the meaning of
“proofI”, since the former is about text on a page while the latter is
about ideas in one’s mind. And we have just shown that the Gödel
sentence G is provableI but not provableF, which means that the extensions of “proof” for the intuitionist and the formalist are also not
the same. In fact, I argue there is a more striking difference between
them: whereas the formalist’s concept of proof has definite extension, meaning “it has the same members in all the circumstances
in which it exists at all,” the intuitionist’s concept of proof does
not. Even though “its intension is perfectly sharp,” there is no fixed
set of provableI arithmetical propositions (Linnebo, 2018, p. 202).
“Proof”, for the intuitionist, is what Dummett calls an indefinitely
extensible concept, meaning “for any definite characterization of
it, there is a natural extension of this characterization, which yields
a more inclusive concept” (Dummett, 1978, p. 195). Any formal
system that seeks to include all the provableI arithmetical propohttps://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol2/iss1/31
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“Formal systems are bound to a collection
of fixed rules in a way that the mind,
in its versatile capacity to reason about
mathematics, is not.”
Gödel sentence is a theorem. But this expanded system is also incomplete, because it has its own Gödel sentence, and this process
can be repeated ad infinitum. The fact that, in each case, a fixed
axiomatization of acceptable methods of proof can be made more
inclusive by meta-mathematically reasoning about the truth of its
Gödel sentence means that the extension of “proofI” is not definite,
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but rather is indefinitely extensible. A definite extension would already contain within it all of the provable propositions, but in any
sufficiently powerful formal system of arithmetic, Gödel showed
there is always a true proposition which has yet to be adjoined.
The strength of intuitionism and other non-formalist philosophies
of mathematics is that they are able to account for the truth of this
proposition by reasoning outside the bounds of the formal system.
What intuitionism gets right is that there is something fundamentally informal about mathematical reasoning. The proofs we construct
in our minds about natural numbers cannot be fully replicated by
any fixed collection of proof methods, since those methods, upon
being translated into syntactic rules within a formal system, will
fail to prove a true proposition about arithmetic. And no sooner do
we augment our characterization of arithmetic to take this proposition into account than a new proposition materializes, asserting of
itself that it cannot be proven by our new methods. Intuitionists are
unsurprised by Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem because they
believe the mind’s understanding of mathematics has an intricacy
that overflows any attempt to axiomatize it – the idea we have of
a mathematical truth is “richer and fuller than all the definitions
which we can give of it, than all the forms or combinations of signs
or of propositions by means of which we can express it” (Boutroux,
1920, p. 203. Translation in Dresden, 1924, p. 36). Formal systems
are bound to a collection of fixed rules in a way that the mind, in its
versatile capacity to reason about mathematics, is not. Hence, intuitionists are neither aided nor attacked by this ostensibly negative
result of Gödel, which applies only to formal systems that are far
afield from our intuitive understanding of arithmetic.
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